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Reforms Must Be Judged Against Reality, Not Nostalgia

Reforms Must Be Judged Against Reality, Not Nostalgia.


One of the most fascinating aspects of Nigeria’s current political debate is the tendency of many commentators to evaluate ongoing reforms as though the country they inherited was functioning perfectly well. It is a curious exercise in selective memory. We are invited to examine today’s inflation, today’s exchange-rate volatility, and today’s cost-of-living pressures without any serious consideration of the structural weaknesses that produced them.


That is not analysis. It is politics.


The proper way to evaluate a reform programme is not to ask whether there is pain in the transition. Almost every major economic restructuring in modern history has involved difficult adjustments. The correct question is whether the reforms are addressing the underlying distortions that made the old system unsustainable in the first place.


On that basis, Nigeria is moving in the right direction.


Before the current reforms, Nigeria operated an economic model built on a series of contradictions. We subsidized consumption while neglecting production. We maintained multiple exchange rates that rewarded arbitrage rather than enterprise. We financed government obligations through borrowing while pretending that revenue performance was adequate. We depended excessively on crude oil receipts while paying lip service to diversification.


The result was predictable.


Public finances became increasingly fragile. Debt service consumed growing portions of government revenue. State governments struggled to meet basic obligations. Local governments remained chronically underfunded. The federation was excessively exposed to fluctuations in global oil prices. Every downturn in the oil market triggered panic across the entire governmental structure.


This was not sustainability. It was deferred crisis.


The significance of the current reform agenda cannot be understood unless one first appreciates the magnitude of the distortions it sought to correct.


The removal of fuel subsidy was not an act of cruelty. It was an acknowledgement of fiscal reality. For years, Nigeria spent enormous sums subsidizing consumption while underinvesting in infrastructure, education, healthcare, and productive capacity. The subsidy system itself became a breeding ground for inefficiency, rent-seeking, and corruption.


Similarly, exchange-rate unification was not designed to punish citizens. It was intended to eliminate a system that rewarded privileged access to foreign exchange while discouraging transparency and productive investment.


Neither reform was painless. No serious economist expected otherwise.


But the absence of pain is not the measure of good policy. Sustainability is.


This brings us to a point that many critics consistently overlook.


The most remarkable development in Nigeria’s fiscal landscape today is not the performance of NNPC. It is the changing structure of federation revenues and the growing fiscal capacity of subnational governments.


For decades, state governments lived at the mercy of monthly allocations from Abuja. Many could not pay salaries without federal intervention. Bailouts became routine. Emergency support became expected. Governors frequently found themselves unable to meet even the most basic obligations.


That reality has changed significantly.


Today, states receive substantially higher allocations than they did before these reforms. More importantly, local governments—the tier of government closest to the people—have greater access to resources than at any point in recent memory.


This development should fundamentally alter the national conversation.


Rather than obsess exclusively over federal policy, citizens should increasingly demand accountability from governors and local government administrators. If states now enjoy greater fiscal capacity, where are the corresponding improvements in roads, schools, healthcare facilities, agriculture, water supply, and local economic development?


If local governments are receiving more resources, why are many communities not seeing a proportional improvement in service delivery?


These questions matter because governance is not merely about revenue collection. It is about revenue utilization.


One of the unintended consequences of Nigeria’s long-standing dependence on oil wealth was the concentration of public attention on the Federal Government. Citizens became conditioned to view Abuja as both the source of all resources and the solution to all problems.


The reforms now underway expose a different reality.


As more resources flow to states and local governments, responsibility becomes increasingly decentralized. Citizens can no longer accept excuses from subnational leaders who possess the resources but fail to produce results.


This is one of the least appreciated benefits of the current restructuring.


Of course, critics point to inflation, food prices, and exchange-rate pressures. They are correct to do so. These are serious concerns that demand continuous policy attention.


However, it is intellectually dishonest to discuss these challenges without acknowledging their origins.


The subsidy regime was not free.


Artificial exchange rates were not free.


Chronic borrowing was not free.


The illusion of stability that many now romanticize carried enormous hidden costs. What current reforms have done is bring many of those costs into the open. The adjustment is painful precisely because the distortions were so deep.


This is why the quality of opposition discourse has become an increasingly important issue.


A democracy benefits from strong opposition. Governments should be challenged. Policies should be scrutinized. Leaders should be held accountable.


But opposition has a responsibility beyond criticism.


It must offer an alternative.


Unfortunately, much of contemporary opposition politics in Nigeria appears content to amplify public frustration without presenting a credible framework for achieving different outcomes.


It is not enough to say inflation is high.


What would you do differently?


It is not enough to criticize exchange-rate reforms.


What alternative mechanism would you implement?


It is not enough to oppose subsidy removal.


How would you finance the fiscal burden it created?


These are the questions that separate governance from rhetoric.


Take the example of Peter Obi, who remains one of the most prominent voices in opposition politics. He is undoubtedly effective at identifying public grievances and articulating popular frustrations. Yet there remains a persistent gap between criticism and comprehensive policy alternatives.


Nigerians deserve more than declarations that things are difficult. They already know things are difficult.


What they need are detailed answers to difficult questions.


How would revenues be increased?


How would foreign exchange be managed?


How would public debt be controlled?


How would investment be stimulated?


How would inflation be moderated without recreating the distortions that caused the problem in the first place?


These are governance questions, not campaign slogans.


The reality is that many of the reforms now being criticized are reforms that virtually every serious economic observer agreed were necessary. The disagreement was never about whether they should happen. It was about how they should happen and how quickly accompanying relief measures should be implemented.


That distinction matters.


Reasonable people may disagree about execution. They may disagree about sequencing. They may disagree about the adequacy of social protection mechanisms.


What is increasingly difficult to defend, however, is the argument that the old model was preferable.


It was not.


The old model produced dependency, fragility, opacity, and fiscal vulnerability.


The new model is still evolving, and it remains imperfect. But it is moving Nigeria toward greater transparency, stronger revenue generation, improved fiscal federalism, and reduced dependence on a single commodity.


That is progress.


History often treats reformers more kindly than contemporaries do because history benefits from perspective. The immediate costs are always visible. The long-term benefits emerge gradually.


Nigeria’s reform journey is far from complete. Government must continue to improve efficiency, strengthen social safety nets, support productive sectors, and ensure that economic growth translates into better living standards.


But we should not allow political nostalgia to cloud economic reality.


The question before Nigerians is not whether the transition has been difficult.


It has.


The real question is whether we should return to the unsustainable model that produced the crisis in the first place.


The answer to that question should be obvious.


A nation cannot borrow its way to prosperity. It cannot subsidize its way to competitiveness. It cannot manipulate its way to productivity. And it cannot depend indefinitely on a single commodity for its survival.


The future belongs to countries willing to confront reality.


That is why these reforms, despite their imperfections and despite the hardship accompanying them, represent movement in the right direction.


And that is why they deserve to be judged against the realities they inherited, not against a romanticized version of a past that never truly existed.


Otunba Segun Showunmi 

The Alternative.

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